Abstract-We exploit a quasi-natural experiment of military draftees in Russia during World War I to examine the effects of a massive, negative labor shock on agricultural production. Employing a novel district-level panel data set, we find that mass mobilization produces a dramatic decrease in cultivated area. Surprisingly, farms with communal land tenure exhibit greater resilience to the labor shock than private farms. The resilience stems from peasants reallocating labor in favor of the commune because of the increased attractiveness of its nonmarket access to land and social insurance. Our results support an institutional explanation of factor misallocation in agriculture.
I. Introduction S EVERAL generations of development theories, including the celebrated Lewis model (Lewis, 1954) , consider persistent labor misallocation in the agricultural sector as one of the main impediments to economic growth. Indeed, in many developing economies, agriculture possesses a large share of labor but makes a less-than-proportionate contribution to aggregate output (Gollin, Lagakos, & Waugh, 2014) . A principal policy implication of this view is that a coordinated reallocation of labor from traditional farms to modern firms would initiate an economic takeoff (Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1989; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Sah & Stiglitz, 1984) . Notable yet controversial historical examples of this development strategy are Stalin's industrialization of the Soviet Union, the Second Five-Year Plan in India, and Ataturk's etatisme years in Turkey.
Despite extensive theoretical and policy attention, we find little rigorous empirical evidence regarding the economic impact of large-scale labor reallocation. In particular, what is the short-run impact on the traditional sector? This information is crucial for social welfare analysis and assessing popular support for the reform. To address this gap in the literature, we use the mobilization of Russian military draftees, the majority of them rural peasants, during World War I as a quasi-natural experiment on the short-run consequences of a massive negative labor shock for agricultural production.
Late imperial Russia is a classic underdeveloped economy, characterized by an agricultural sector that employed over 70% of the workforce but produced less than half of aggregate output (Davies, 1990; Markevich & Harrison, 2011) . A novel aspect of our analysis is that we exploit the particularly rich institutional environment of the Russian Empire. Traditional farms governed by communal land tenure coexisted side-by-side with farms with private tenure. The historical literature provides evidence that, ceteris paribus, private farms were relatively more productive than commune farms (Gatrell, 1986) , and both historical and modern accounts blame the institution of the commune for the backwardness of Russian agriculture (Gerschenkron, 1965; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) . The commune restricted property rights to land, distorting individual incentives. These same restrictions enabled the commune to ensure access to land to its members, providing social insurance. In contrast, private farms did not face such restrictions and relied on markets for insurance. Private farms managed one-quarter of the cultivated grain area in an average district before the war. This share varied considerably across districts, from 0 to 96%, granting an opportunity to examine how institutional frictions mediate responses to labor shocks in detail.
Employing a newly constructed district-level panel data set on agricultural production before and during the war, we relate the cultivated area of wheat, rye, oat, and barley grain crops, our measure of agricultural output, to changes in gender imbalance between 1913 and 1916. These changes were largely driven by the mobilization of about 12 million men into the army (Golovin, 2001 ), but were also affected by other war-related changes in population composition, like flows of military prisoners and wartime refugees. The number of draftees varied substantially across districts because of the realization of complex predetermined mobilization laws (Anfimov, 1962; Sidorov, 1973; Golovin, 2001) . Since the war held fixed the supply of most other productive factors, such as agricultural machines, we can attribute changes in output to changes in labor inputs. The panel structure of our data permits us to enrich the difference-indifferences approach with district-specific time trends and account for unobservable district-level time-invariant factors that vary by farm type.
We find that mass mobilization greatly decreases cultivated grain area in the short run. On average, the removal of 1% of the labor force decreases a district's grain-cropped area by around 3% and the removal of a marginal worker from a district would result in a yearly loss of 296 rubles, roughly four times the subsistence level. This large response is not explained by an inability of farms to adjust to labor removal.
1 Historical accounts describe active labor and land rental markets, in addition to the commune's allocation mechanisms, before and during the war (Kondratiev, 1922; Anfimov, 1962) . Disaggregating the effect by farm type, we find that the grain-cultivated area of communal farms surprisingly responds less than private farms to the removal of labor. The mobilization of 1% of the district-wide labor force leads to only a 0.7% decrease in grain output by commune farms compared to a 5.1% decrease on private farms. We would expect private farms, as the more efficient farms, to have reduced output less unless there were important institutional frictions.
We submit evidence that nonmarket access to land and the social insurance of the commune were prominent factors explaining the divergence between farm types during the war. These institutional features redirected peasant labor back to the commune in response to mobilization, enabling the resilience of the commune. We show that commune resilience is greater in districts where peasant labor had better access to the private sector before mobilization. Next, we show that the resilience of the commune is inhibited by the 1906 Stolypin agrarian reform, which partially dismantled the commune's control over property rights. Finally, we establish that commune farms increased rye production, the crop largely consumed by peasants (Kondratiev, 1922) , relative to the production of market grain, and this increase is magnified in districts where peasants had better nonmarket access to land. The resilience of commune farm production to mobilization highlights an underappreciated benefit of the commune for Russian peasants: its social insurance.
Although we study a short-run effect, we argue that these institutional frictions would also have had important effects on the allocation of resources before the war, and, hence, our findings illuminate the persistent nature of low productivity in agriculture. As Banerjee and Moll (2010) show, a persistent productivity shock, such as the nonmarket allocation of land, is necessary for a long-run equilibrium to feature misallocation. Under the magnifying glass of mass mobilization, we demonstrate that the commune did not serve as a labor supplier when industrial jobs opened up and factor prices should have pushed labor out of the commune. Under more normal economic conditions, the influence of nonmarket access to land on the opportunity cost of commune land likely would have similarly affected peasants' valuation of low-productivity projects, such as subsistence production, making them more desirable than optimal.
Next, we subject our quasi-experimental approach to a more thorough examination. First, we run a placebo test by allowing mobilization to occur before it actually happened. Second, we control for temperature and rainfall, since these are time-varying factors that could be correlated with mass mobilization and affect output. Third, to alleviate concerns about measurement error, other omitted variables, and potential endogeneity, we construct a predicted mobilization variable using distance to the nearest military recruitment centers. Fourth, we address attrition bias in the presence of selection on observables.
While these robustness checks strengthen our evidence, several threats to identification remain. First, the war economy produced an additional factor input shock. The military conscripted 2.6 million horses (Anfimov, 1962) , and any correlation between these two input shocks could bias our estimates. We find the effect of mobilization is unaffected by the inclusion of horse mobilization. During the war, the supply of female labor could also have changed. We rely on stylized facts that the amount of female labor in agriculture did not substantially change during the war. Second, the war produced a shock to market demand. Our econometric exercise accommodates aggregate demand shocks, and in the online appendix, we examine the robustness of the results to local demand shocks. Third, since our main dependent variable, cultivated area, does not capture changes in labor inputs per plot, we explore in the online appendix the effect of mobilization using data on yields, which are of worse quality. Fourth, we provide additional evidence in the online appendix that peasants responded rationally to changes in the market environment and the price of labor.
Our results have profound implications for Russian economic development, as well as for the broader development literature. First, by affecting the supply of agricultural output to the market, peasants' decision to return to subsistence production reaffirms World War I and the commune as mutual determinants of food shortages in urban areas, a major driving force of the Russian Revolution (Kondratiev, 1922) . Second, agriculture's short-run response to labor reallocation is a key factor in justifying or criticizing Stalin's industrialization as a development strategy. Robert Allen's (2003) influential interpretation of Stalin's industrialization hinges on viewing collectivization as a massive reallocation of labor from the countryside without causing a fall in agricultural output. Our finding of a decrease in output indicates that Stalin's industrialization imposed significant short-run costs on the Soviet economy, consistent with the findings in Cheremukhin et al. (2016) . Finally, our findings point to the importance of a social insurance substitute for subsistence agriculture on the path toward structural transformation.
II. Previous Literature
Modern empirical estimates indicate large potential returns of labor reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing. Vollrath (2009) reports that between 30% and 40% of variation in income per capita across the globe is due to factor misallocation. The literature usually emphasizes spatial misallocation due to various market imperfections such as transportation costs. Closer to our analysis, Hayashi and Prescott (2008) identify a cultural barrier to labor mobility out of the agricultural sector and explore how its removal Most of the recent firm-level evidence on factor misallocation comes from within-sector dispersion in firms' returns to capital and does not speak directly to labor misallocation in agriculture and its consequences for underdevelopment (Banerjee & Duflo, 2005; Hseih & Klenow, 2009) . Papers that specifically focus on factor misallocation in agriculture (Adamopolous & Restuccia, 2014; Foster & Rosenzweig, 2010) choose to examine the differential returns to land rather than to labor. Our findings complement these papers by showing the dependence of labor misallocation on institutional frictions in land markets. Acemoglu and Author (2004) also use the military draft as an exogenous source of variation in labor supply during World War II to identify the labor supply impact on female wages in the United States. The U.S. economy in the 1940s, having already passed through its agricultural transition and with female labor primarily engaged in household production before the war, is not well suited for our research question.
The theoretical literature on factor misallocation provides some justification for why we would observe labor misallocation in the Russian countryside and why it would persist. Banerjee and Moll (2010) argue that frictions in land markets are natural candidates for causing persistent misallocation. In addition, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) show that permanently fixed taxes need to be strongly positively correlated with firm-specific productivity to get large effects from misallocation. In the commune, where the tax burden was shared, this avenue was also possible.
The coexistence of private and commune farms evokes a dualistic view on Russian agriculture, and there is a small industry of papers devoted to test various aspects of dualistic models versus the neoclassical counterpart (Rosenzweig, 1980) . The usual presentation of dual sectors as a modern, technologically superior sector juxtaposed to a traditional one could misrepresent the relative value of the traditional sector. In our case, even households that made the transition to the modern sector may still prefer the traditional sector in some circumstances, an insight that goes back to Harris and Todaro (1970) . Agriculture was the largest sector of the Russian economy before World War I, accounting for 8.3 billion rubles, or 44% of national income in 1913 (Markevich & Harrison, 2011) and employing an even larger share of workers, up to 72% of the gainfully employed population (Davies, 1990) . The average productivity of labor was only 109 rubles in agriculture, compared to 742 rubles in industry. Assuming sector-specific Cobb-Douglas aggregate production functions, the agricultural productivity gap was 6.8. This factor of 7 corresponds to the upper end of modern assessments for developing countries (Gollin et al., 2014) , consistent with the common belief that too many people were involved in land cultivation.
The dominant view blames the institution of the commune, and the most widespread type of the commune, the repartition commune, in particular, for this productivity gap (Gerschenkron, 1965) . The repartition commune held title on land and could reallocate arable plots among member households under a two-thirds majority. Restrictive land rights in repartition communes diminished out-migration even when the potential returns were high (Chernina, Castañeda Dower, & Markevich, 2014) and likely distorted other individual choices (see section A1 of the online appendix for more details). Castañeda Dower and Markevich (2016) have shown that restrictive property rights depressed agricultural productivity; however, Nafziger (2010) argues that repartitions functioned as a market surrogate, mitigating the potential misallocation of resources. In general, communes of all types exercised considerable power to regulate agricultural production as well as guaranteed access to land through nonmarket allocation.
Private landowners did not face restrictions on rights over their land. Private farms were less credit constrained and had larger plots than peasants did in the commune, and hence they were in a better position to mechanize and take advantage of economies of scale (Anfimov, 1962) . Private landowners would either farm their land, hiring labor from peasant communes, or rent their land out to industrious peasants. The private farm functioned as an outside option for both members and deserters of the peasant commune. The flow of labor between private and commune farms occurred largely within districts (Anfimov, 1961) , and the crossdistrict migration rate was low (Trojnitskij, 1900 (Trojnitskij, -1910 .
The 1906 Stolypin agrarian reform aimed to transform the role of the commune by granting peasants the right to privatize the arable plots that they cultivated. Privatization reduced the land available to the commune for redistribution.
2 However, the implementation of the reform faltered due to bureaucratic and administrative costs and only modestly changed land tenure in the countryside. Thus, two different modes of agricultural production-traditional and modern-continued to coexist side by side, providing a unique laboratory to explore an institutional basis for labor misallocation and the productivity gap.
Grain was the main product of Russian agriculture and accounted for about half of agricultural output and close to 90% of sown area (Markevich & Harrison, 2011; Davies, 1990) . The four main grain crops-winter and summer wheat, winter and summer rye, oat, and barley-produced the bulk of cereals. Oat and barley were largely summer crops; winter rye was the most important winter crop. Winter rye was mainly grown for peasant household consumption; wheat, followed by barley, was produced for internal and external markets, and oat was mainly used for livestock feeding (Kondratiev, 1922) . Local climate conditions and the proximity to grain markets affected which crops dominated a given area. In terms of labor costs, all cereals were similar, being less labor intensive than potatoes or flax (Strumilin, 1966) .
Both commune and private farm production used the three-field system, based on a rotation of winter crops, summer crops, and then fallow on the same plot. The short growing season did not allow cultivating summer and winter crops on the same plot during the same year. In terms of labor demand, the summer season was peak and winter slack. The production technologies remained primitive. Horses provided driving power for traditional light wooden ploughs, although more complicated agricultural equipment, like seeding and reaping machines, were in use on some farms. The standard production unit was a malefemale pair. Women worked in the fields together with men, exploiting comparative advantage (Knipovich, 1921) .
Grain productivity was higher on private land than on commune land, and both types of farms experienced growth in yields during the prewar years. The commune compensated lower expected returns by providing extra support to its members. Nonmarket access to land was just one form of social insurance. Other examples include commune members helping peasant soldatki (wives of mobilized soldiers) during the war (Kondratiev, 1922; Anfimov, 1962) .
The Great War did not change the institutional environment in the Russian countryside. Land and labor markets continued to operate (Anfimov, 1962; Gatrell, 2005) . While the war brought some elements of government regulation of the grain market, both commune and private farms maintained the freedom to make the major economic decisions (Litoshenko, 2001) . Farms largely felt the impact of the Great War through a huge negative shock to the labor supply. By the summer of 1916, about 12.3 million men were mobilized into the army, or about 40% of men aged 18 to 43. The designers of the mobilization laws, drafted in 1874 and 1912, aimed to raise a large number of troops over a vast amount of space in a short period of time while minimizing the expected loss of agricultural output. The implementation of these complicated mobilization laws generated variation in the share of draftees across regions (see section A2 of the online appendix for details). Prisoners-of-war and refugees constituted an additional source of variation in gender imbalance. Value added in agriculture in 1916 decreased by 19% relative to the prewar level (Markevich & Harrison, 2011) . The decrease in supply was accompanied by an increase in market demand for grain from the growing army and war refugees who migrated to cities. The urban population increased by 1.55 million people by October 1, 1915 (Kondratiev, 1922) . This increase in demand was counterbalanced by the collapse of foreign trade due to the war blockade (Litoshenko, 2001) . 4 All in all, wheat prices were about two and half times higher in 1916 than in 1913 (Kondratiev, 1922) . Oat prices increased the most because of the army's demand for horse feed. The army also increased relative demand for barley (Anfimov, 1962) .
IV. Hypotheses
What were the effects of mass mobilization on agricultural output? Following historical characterizations of Russian agriculture, one might expect a rather modest response to mass mobilization relative to a frictionless neoclassical economy. The predominant estimates of ''redundant'' labor (Litoshenko, 2001; Allen, 2003) were larger than the labor removed.
5 However, modern models of persistent misallocation (Banerjee & Moll, 2010; Hseih & Klenow, 2009; Restuccia & Rogerson, 2008; Hayashi & Prescott, 2008) are generally consistent with a short-run decrease in output following a negative labor shock. In this section, we develop hypotheses that distinguish institutional factors from behavioral frictions, short-run adjustment costs, or other market frictions.
In the ideal experiment, to explore whether the effects of massive labor reallocation depend on institutional factors, we would exogenously remove labor independently by institutional type and obtain estimates of the change in output for the commune and private agriculture separately. We face three departures from such an ideal case. First, we observe only the removal of labor at the district level in the aggregate and not by institutional type. Second, mass mobilization could affect the labor supply between commune and private farms since these two modes of agricultural production were intimately linked. Third, the variation in mass mobilization is not generated by experimental control.
What kind of differential responses of private and commune farms could we expect? Historians generally agree that private farms had higher marginal returns and were more capital intensive (Gatrell, 1986) . Under the assumption of a competitive local market, all else equal, wage labor should become more attractive on two margins. On the extensive margin, the negative shock should increase the wage and encourage households to engage in wage labor. Similarly, on the intensive margin, labor should flow to the highest marginal return, which was on private farms. Mobilization should, thus, place a heavier burden on traditional farms.
This hypothesis may not hold in the presence of nonmarket access to land. In this case, households could violate the separation property and choose to reallocate resources away from wage labor and return to self-sufficiency in the commune instead of allocating factors according to profit maximization (see Sadoulet, de Janvry, & Benjamin, 2002 , for a theoretical example of this effect).
6 Indeed, the quantity and quality of land available to a peasant household within the commune increased during the war because of the conscription of other members into the army. These changes reinforced each other and encouraged the household to withdraw from supplying labor to the market. Besides wage labor returning to the commune, peasants could rent private land. Rental prices were mostly prohibitively high before the war, with landowners holding most of the bargaining power (Anfimov, 1961) , likely making renting less attractive than the newly available commune land. Based on these arguments, our first main hypothesis is that commune farm production should exhibit greater resilience than private farm production in response to mobilization (hypothesis 1).
Hypothesis 1 relies on local competitive labor markets, attracting labor from the commune before the war and continuing to operate during the war. We thus could expect heterogeneous effects by factors that influenced the demand and supply of labor before the war. Districts with a greater share of private farms should have had relatively greater demand for peasant labor before the war, drawing labor out of the commune and leading to greater potential for commune resilience. Similarly, in districts with a greater supply of commune labor to the market, we would expect greater potential for commune resilience. We use commune land inequality in a district as a factor that influenced the supply of commune labor. Greater land inequality indicates that communes were less effective in securing equal access to land, pushing peasants to wage labor.
The second assumption of hypothesis 1 is that peasants valued the commune's nonmarket access to land. We thus would expect to find heterogeneous effects depending on the capacity of the commune to provide such access. Since repartition communes had better capacity for nonmarket access to land, we would see greater resilience for repartition communes. Similarly, we can exploit the difference between provinces with respect to the prewar changes in land tenure as a result of the Stolypin reform. If successfully implemented, the effects of the Stolypin reform would have been to make the economic organization of the commune similar to that of private property and would have limited the ability of the commune to provide nonmarket access to land. We note that if the explanation for commune resilience lies in characteristics that did not vary by commune type, like peasant household behavior, the open field system, or transportation costs between the commune and private farms, we would expect similar responses in repartition and nonrepartition communes.
Our second hypothesis is that mass mobilization is associated with a shift toward production of winter rye, the most important subsistence crop for peasant households (hypothesis 2). While nominal wages on private farms increased, peasants faced uncertainty with respect to real wages due to the increase in the demand for food by the army, inflation, and other wartime factors. In order to guarantee a subsistence living, peasants could opt to smooth income by switching from wage labor to subsistence-oriented production (Morduch, 1995) . Households, whose labor supply decisions were sensitive to the commune's social insurance properties, would primarily return to the commune to engage in subsistence production.
In sum, a reallocation of labor in favor of the commune in response to mass mobilization, and the subsequent switch back to subsistence from market-oriented production, is consistent with finding relative resilience in commune production in the midst of an overall decline. This explanation for commune resilience also explains why we might observe a rather large negative effect on district aggregate production since the loss of production due to mass mobilization is compounded twice-once through the movement of labor from more to less efficient farms and once through a switch from market to subsistence production.
V. Data and Methods
We construct a district (uezd)-level data set to study the effect of mobilization on agriculture. The data set includes the whole Russian Empire, excluding the Great Duchy of Finland, covering more than seven hundred districts on this territory in 1913. We use 1913 and 1914 as benchmark prewar years (the war started at the end of the 1914 summer season) and 1916-the last prerevolutionary year-as a treatment year. We have fewer observations for 1916 than for 1913 and 1914 because of the occupation of the western provinces by Germany and Austro-Hungary. We address concerns about attrition in section VIA.
We combine various official sources to construct the data set (see the list of our sources in the online appendix). We follow the historical literature (Golovin, 2001 ) and define our 1916 mobilization measure as the difference between 1916 and 1913 gender imbalance in the rural population (women minus men). We assign 0 to the mobilization measure for 1913 and 1914 observations. 7 For cultivated area and crop yields of winter and summer rye, winter and summer wheat, oat, and barley, we have two observations for each district-year: one for private land and one for commune land. Due to data availability, most potential control variables do not vary by time or farm type.
We prefer cultivated area rather than yields as our main dependent variable because of data quality. Yield data are not an independent measure but a product of cultivated area and crop yield per hectare measured in a sample subarea and suffer heavily from attrition in 1916. In addition, yield data are much more sensitive to unobservable or poorly observable variables such as local weather that might correlate with mobilization. Cultivated area is a reasonable approximation of crop yield in terms of the agricultural production function due to the primitive state of technology. The number of laborers strongly predicts area under crops, conditional on total arable land, and cultivated area strongly predicts expected agricultural yield. Table 1 presents summary statistics. Around 194,000 rural citizens lived in an average district, with substantial variation across districts. Sixteen thousand people, or about 8%, were mobilized from the countryside in an average district. The mobilization measure could be negative if there were more men than women in the inflow of refugees, prisoners-of-war, and wartime migrants, and these outnumbered mobilized men. The maximum number of draftees in a district was 144,000 men.
The average amount of cultivated area by crop was as follows: 40,470 hectares for winter rye and 1,270 hectares for summer rye, 11,260 for winter wheat and 33,620 for summer wheat, 26,460 for oats, and 17,240 for barley, or all in all 132,000 hectares for these grain crops. Winter rye totaled about 31% of crops on average, but this crop was mainly concentrated in the commune.
We employ provincial autumn prices on rye, wheat, oat, and barley to construct a unified price-weighted area-undercrops index. This index more closely approximates valueadded and accounts for changes in grain demand by weighting the dependent variable by grain prices (normalized by wholesale foodstuffs prices). Price-weighted area under crops in a district was 90.42 on average (and 45.37 if to disaggregate by farm type).
There were almost 57,000 horses in an average district in 1912. The 1910 agricultural machine census reports almost 3,000 machines of various types and more than 27,000 units of other agricultural tools in an average district. Urbanization and literacy rates were low, 13% and 21% on average, correspondingly (with noticeable exceptions of 97% of the urban population in Saint Petersburg district and about 80% of literate citizens in Baltic districts). The average commune in European districts had about 100 households in 1905. The repartition commune accounted for 73% of communes in European Russia. As such, land inequality was generally low; the average commune land Gini index in a district, capturing both within-and between-commune land inequality, equals 0.23.
Our estimation strategy requires an exogenous source of variation in the supply of agricultural labor in a districtmass mobilization, as such a source is attractive for a number of reasons. First, the mobilization rules generated local variation in labor removal that was arguably orthogonal to unobservable shocks to agricultural production. The mobilization rules were predetermined decades prior to the war; the probability for a man between 21 and 43 years old to be drafted into the army during the war depended on his legal status at the age of 21, several years before the actual mobilization for most draftees. Since legal status depended on factors that were largely out of an individual household's control, the scope for manipulation according to idiosyncratic conditions was limited (see section A of the online appendix for further details). Second, conditional on the probability of being drafted, the differential impact of removing one individual versus another was minimal given the primitive technology. Third, mobilized men would have been the main demographic group employed by industrial 
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firms, and the sheer scale of mobilization simulates a policy of directed reallocation that could transform an underdeveloped economy. We prefer to work in levels, and not logs or shares, for several reasons. First, due to the various competing explanations of the response to the labor removal shock, the middle-ground approach would be to use levels and not proportionate adjustments. Before the war, private farms cultivated less grain area on average than commune farms, so the relative change would only magnify the resilience effect. Second, transforming the main variable of interest into shares or logs compresses this variable, something undesirable in our context where identification from either end of the distribution is as important as from the middle. In the online appendix, we explore the nonlinear effect of mass mobilization. Third, mobilization takes on 0 values for all districts before the war, making estimation in logs depend on an arbitrarily chosen constant. Fourth, the substitution toward grain crops, which were relatively less labor intensive, from other production activities will cause more bias in relative changes than absolute changes at greater levels of labor removal.
We control for size of rural population as the main input factor besides land. We use lagged rural population since the population in 1916 would have been affected by mobilization. We take advantage of the panel structure of the data and estimate in first-differences accounting for district-specific characteristics. We argue that fixed factors absorb many of the confounding variables such as soil quality, the level of mechanization, the capital stock, transportation, and other transaction costs. These variables in principle vary but were most likely fixed in the wartime environment.
To understand the short-run effects of mobilization, our basic specification is represented by the following equation:
where D stands for first differences, subscript i indexes districts, and t indexes the time period. Y denotes cultivated area or the price-weighted area index or grain yield, aggregated over commune and private farms, in district i at time t. M is the mobilization measure, P stands for lagged rural population, and x t represent year fixed effects. The time fixed effects account for contemporaneous unobservables that affect all districts, such as changes in aggregate demand. In addition, we introduce district-specific linear trends (u i ), which serve to augment the basic difference-indifferences approach by allowing for differences in preexisting trends. All our results hold if we exclude them. The idiosyncratic error term, e, is assumed to be uncorrelated across districts, but not necessarily within districts since we cluster standard errors at the district level and report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. We point out that working in first differences alleviates some concerns about autocorrelation.
To investigate hypotheses 1 and 2 on the institutional roots of labor misallocation, we employ the following basic equation:
where notation is as in equation (1), C stands for commune dummy, and k is an index for the farm type. As in equation (1) we allow errors to be correlated within districts and report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The coefficient a c corresponds to the magnitude of the differential response in output to mobilization by the commune. Thus, it governs whether we see greater resilience in response to the shock on commune farms than on private farms. A positive and statistically significant estimate of a c is consistent with hypothesis 1 since commune farms would decrease grain output less than private farms. If local labor markets are competitive, albeit imperfectly, a negative coefficient, or one that is not statistically different from zero, would reject hypothesis 1. A similar logic applies for hypothesis 2, with the dependent variable being winter rye production or the share of winter rye.
We modify equation (2) to explore whether the commune resilience (or convergence) effect of mobilization is explained by variables representing proxies for supply and demand for hired labor on private farms, commune type and size, and the Stolypin reform implementation measures. For each variable, hypothesis 1 (or 2) is confirmed, and the null is rejected if the estimate of the triple interaction term between the commune dummy, mobilization, and the variable is statistically different from zero or the joint effect is statistically different from zero and of the right sign (depending on the variable, ''right'' could be positive or negative). In this case, we can claim that part of the resilience effect is explained by the above factors.
VI. Results
We begin by examining the effects of mobilization on agricultural production in a district, aggregating across both farm types. Column 1 of table 2 uses cropped grain area as the measure of agricultural output, and the second column employs the price-weighted cultivated area index. The negative and highly significant coefficient on the mobilization variable demonstrates that the removal of labor decreased output. The magnitude of the effect is large. According to the estimates of column 1, an increase in mobilization by one standard deviation (i.e., 13,320 men, or 6.87% of the average rural population in a district) decreased cropped area by 14,250 hectares or 10.88% of prewar levels. The absolute value of this figure should be a lower bound on the magnitude of the response to purely random removal of the same number of middle-aged men since the predetermined mobilization rules aimed to minimize expected agricultural loss. In the short run, labor 251 LABOR MISALLOCATION AND MASS MOBILIZATION reallocation of a similar scale would impose a significant cost on the economy in terms of loss in agricultural output.
Through the lens of a production function, one can get a better sense of the magnitude of the effect, but we caution readers on the short-run nature of our effects. One could interpret equation (1) as a first-order approximation of a district aggregate production function if one assumes homogeneous labor and free mobility of labor within a district. In this case, one could think of a as representing the marginal productivity of labor. The estimated decline in output from column 2 implies that the marginal productivity of labor at the average level of mass mobilization was 296 rubles, which is four times higher than the minimum amount of income needed to support an average family (roughly the prewar estimate of marginal productivity) 8 and over double GDP per capita in Russia in 1913 (Markevich & Harrison, 2011) . As one might expect, the massive labor removal from agriculture substantially decreased the productivity differential between manufacturing and agricultural sectors. The agricultural productivity gap narrows, at least temporarily, from 6.8 to 1.7 (see section C1 of the online appendix for details).
Turning to the central result, columns 3 and 4 report the estimates of the effect of mobilization on commune farms relative to private farms. As in columns 1 and 2, we report the results for the cropped grain area first and then for a price-weighted area index. Agricultural output on commune farms responded less strongly to mobilization than private farms did. The coefficients on mobilization itself and its interaction with the commune farm dummy are significant but have opposite signs-negative and positive, respectively. The estimated effect of mobilization on commune farm production is positive in column 3 and negative in column 4, and both effects are statistically different from zero at the 5% level. When interpreting the positive effect in column 3 as an expansion of cultivated area, one should keep in mind the secular decline in cropped area. The coefficients in column 4 suggest that a standard deviation increase in mobilization in a district decreased agricultural output by 11% of the prewar average for commune farms and by 79% of the prewar average for private farms.
We interpret commune resilience as evidence of the substitution of labor between two farm types. In support of this interpretation, historical anecdotes describe peasants abandoning the renting of private land in favor of farming com- Grain Area: Cultivated area of summer and winter wheat, summer and winter rye, barley, and oats. Grain Area Autumn Price Index: The cultivated area of summer and winter wheat, summer and winter rye, barley, and oats, each weighted by autumn crop prices (normalized by wholesale foodstuffs prices). The unit of observation is either a District-Year, where cultivated area is aggregated across all farms in a district in a year, or a District-Farm Type-Year, where cultivated area is aggregated across private and commune farms separately in a district in a year. FDFE estimates the model in first differences using district fixed effects. The drop in observations in columns 7 and 8 is due to the 1905 census, which covers the European part of the empire only (not including Kuban, Stavropol, and Terek provinces). Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.1. 8 According to Nefedov (2010) , an individual needed about 245 kilograms of grain per year for subsistence. We multiply this amount by the price of rye (4.88 kopeks per kilograms) and by an average family size of six, to get 72 rubles per year.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS mune land (Anfimov, 1962) . In addition, peasants who were previously wage laborers but returned to the commune would likely have engaged in subsistence production, which would have caused the value-added index to experience a greater decline for commune farms. We provide more arguments in support of this interpretation of commune resilience in the remainder of table 2. First, we allow for the effect of mobilization to vary by share of private farm area in 1913. If there were little substitution between private and commune farms, we should not see a significant coefficient on this additional interaction term. In contrast, if labor substitution explains the results, then we should see a more positive effect in districts with a greater share of private farms, a proxy for labor demand. Columns 5 and 6 report a negative and significant effect of mobilization on commune farms in districts with zero private-farm grain production; 9 the coefficient on the interaction term between mobilization variable and the commune dummy is negative and highly significant. Additionally, as expected, we see greater commune resilience as the share of private farms increases. Finally, in columns 7 and 8, we account for differences in the prewar supply of commune labor, using the commune land Gini coefficient as a proxy. The coefficients reported in columns 7 and 8 demonstrate a larger commune resilience effect for districts with greater prewar labor supply to private farms.
We investigate the institutional roots of labor misallocation by specifically focusing on nonmarket access to land afforded to members of the commune. 10 In table 3, we present results for four different mediating variables in pairs of columns-one for grain area under crops and one for the output price index. First, we consider the share of repartition communes in a district. Communes of this type provided better nonmarket access to land because of the institutionalized repartitioning of plots. In columns 1 and 2, we find that districts with a greater share of repartition communes experienced a greater commune resilience effect. The results also show that under a counterfactual of converting all repartition communes to nonrepartition ones, the commune's resilience would be cut in half.
The next two variables that we consider are related to the outcomes of the Stolypin reforms (measured at the province level). The first Stolypin variable captures the instance of transformative change brought about by the reform. The designers of the reform envisioned and expected full adoption of the reform, viewing incomplete implementation as a failure. We create a dummy variable that indicates whether a district resides in a province that had incomplete implementation, defined as the majority of arable land going unaffected by the privatization reform. We expect these districts to behave qualitatively similar to the average district in the results above. In contrast, for those districts that resided in provinces that were transformed by the reform, we expect less commune resilience. In columns 3 and 4, we Grain Area: Cultivated area of summer and winter wheat, summer and winter rye, barley, and oats. Grain Area Autumn Price Index: The cultivated area of summer and winter wheat, summer and winter rye, barley, and oats, each weighted by autumn crop prices (normalized by wholesale foodstuffs prices). The unit of observation is a District-Farm Type-Year, where cultivated area is aggregated across private and commune farms separately in a district in a year. The drop in observations in columns 7 and 8 is due to the Stolypin variables and 1905 census, which cover the European part of the empire only. FDFE estimates the model in first differences using district fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.1. see that indeed districts in provinces with a minority of land area exiting the commune exhibit the commune resilience effect. Quite a different picture emerges for districts located in provinces that were transformed by the Stolypin reform. The effects are best illustrated by the results for the priceweighted output index presented in column 4. Just as the standard model would predict for an economy with a competitive labor market, there is no effect of mobilization for private farms and a negative effect of mobilization for commune farms. This remarkable result suggests that the commune indeed harbored persistent labor misallocation. The Stolypin reform better enabled markets to determine the opportunity cost of land, directing labor to its highest valued use by making subsistence production a more costly alternative and allowing peasants to take advantage of the insurance properties of land markets.
The second Stolypin reform variable is a relative measure, designed to capture the disproportionate impact of the reform on the commune's capacity for nonmarket allocation. We construct the amount of land exiting the commune as a result of the Stolypin reform per exited household and divide this amount by the average household allotment in the commune in a province. Higher values represented a greater impact on the commune's (in)capacity for nonmarket allocation of land.
11 The results, presented in columns 5 and 6, show that the relative adverse impact of the Stolypin reform on nonmarket allocation diminished the commune's resilience, consistent with our hypothesis.
We also consider commune size (the number of households in a commune) as a driver of heterogeneous effects. Under the logic of collective action, average commune size might inhibit collective decision making and, consequently, the nonmarket allocation of land. However, since the commune also functioned as a factor market surrogate (Nafziger, 2010) , average commune size could proxy for the size of the ''market,'' an effect running counter to the collective action one. The empirical results in column 7 provide some evidence for the factor market surrogate view, although the magnitude of the effect is small. Reducing the size of the market by 1 standard deviation in commune size (i.e., 90 households), leaving only 14 households in a commune, would decrease the differential effect by just 15%. The coefficients on the interaction of mobilization and the commune size and the triple interaction of mobilization, commune dummy, and commune size are statistically insignificant for the price-weighted cultivated area (column 8), but have the same signs.
The results on nonmarket allocation of land give persuasive evidence that the commune attracted labor and, more important, offer an explanation for persistent labor misallocation by demonstrating the attractiveness of the commune in the face of an apparent divergence in marginal productivity differentials across private and commune farms. To strengthen this interpretation, we turn to our second hypothesis on social insurance, presumably one of the commune's most attractive features. A return to the commune, at least for some individuals, should be associated with an increase in subsistence crop production, namely, winter rye. Table 4 presents results for the effect of mass mobilization on winter rye production, allowing for heterogeneous effects according to nonmarket access measures. The results in column 1 of table 4 show that winter rye production increased on commune land in response to mobilization. In column 2, we verify that mobilization increased winter rye's share of grain output on commune land. Furthermore, both variables that track the demand for and supply of commune labor before the war are associated with stronger responses (columns 3 and 4).
The key test for the social insurance mechanism comes from the nonmarket access to land variables. In column 5, we see that districts with a greater share of repartition communes had a larger increase in winter rye production in response to mass mobilization. A district with the average share of repartition communes more than doubled the increase in winter rye production relative to a district with only nonrepartition communes. Similarly, according to the results in columns 6 and 7, districts more heavily affected by the Stolypin reform increased winter rye production relatively less and districts in a province with a larger privatized plot relative to the average commune plot had a diminished increase in winter rye production. The results for average commune size in column 8 are also consistent with the connection between nonmarket access to land and social insurance, but they are not statistically significant.
A. Robustness and Threats to Identification
In this section, we aim to strengthen our core set of results. While the identification assumption in equation (1) allows for correlation between mass mobilization and preexisting, district-level trends in agricultural output, we still perform a pretrend analysis as a placebo test since we would not expect observed differences in prewar cultivated grain area to correlate with the level of mobilization (imputed to 1914). In this placebo test, we cannot implement our preferred specification that accounts for districtspecific linear trends. Columns 1 to 3 in table 5 provide the results. The coefficient on placebo mobilization in column 1 is statistically significant, although it is positive. We note that a positive pretrend would likely work against finding a negative effect of mass mobilization. Cropped area, as opposed to yield, should not experience mean reversion. However, the results in column 1 do suggest that there is something different about more heavily mobilized districts. We suspect, and our results confirm (in columns 2 and 3), that mobilization is correlated with the prewar growth in the stock of horses and a corresponding expansion of Grain Area: Cultivated area of summer and winter wheat, summer and winter rye, barley, and oats. The unit of observation is District-Year, where cultivated area is aggregated across all farms in a district in a year. FD estimates the model in first differences. FDFE estimates the model in first differences using district fixed effects. Column 4 shows a quasi-first-stage regression where we explain the cross-sectional variation in the number of mobilized draftees using the variable distance to the nearest recruitment center, which is excludable from the main specification. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test statistic is reported for the crosssection, and the null hypothesis of 0 rank is rejected at the 5% level. To generate the alternative mobilization measure, we use the predicted values for mobilization from the cross-section for the values in 1916 and 0s in years 1913 and 1914. Since the alternative mobilization measure is a generated regressor, we use bootstrapped standard errors in column 5. The drop in observations in column 6 is due to incomplete weather data. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.1. Winter Rye Area: Cultivated area of winter rye. Share of Winter Rye Area: The share of winter rye in the cultivated area of summer and winter wheat, summer and winter rye, barley, and oats. The unit of observation is a District-Farm Type-Year, where cultivated area is aggregated across private and commune farms separately in a district in a year. FDFE estimates the model in first differences using district fixed effects. The drop in observations in columns 4 through 8 is due to the Stolypin variables and the 1905 census, which cover the European part of the empire only. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.1.
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cropped area for feed (oats) in a district (Anfimov, 1962) . Oats are also fairly robust to soil conditions and are easy to plant on new arable land, which had been expanding in the prewar years. We use area under oats as a dependent variable in column 2 and repeat the specification presented in column 1 controlling for our prewar measure of horses in column 3. Accounting for the 1912 stock of horses completely explains the pretrend in oats (not shown) and for all grains (column 3). Hence, allowing for separate district trends is indeed an appropriate solution.
A second econometric concern is that our measure of mobilization suffers from measurement error. In columns 4 and 5 of table 5, we use distance to the nearest military recruitment center, controlling for whether the district is located in a frontline province, 12 to predict the level of mobilization. We then plug in predicted mobilization as a measure of mobilization into the main specification. The resulting increase in the magnitude of the effect of mobilization suggests that measurement error may play a role, and our basic results are attenuated.
We also check whether weather conditions or being located in a frontline province affects the magnitude of our coefficient on mass mobilization. Both variables change over time and could have been correlated with output and mass mobilization. For weather, we use average temperature and total rainfall. The number of observations drops considerably due to incomplete weather data.
13 Nevertheless, even on this reduced sample, the coefficient on mass mobilization remains strongly negative and statistically significant.
In the last column of table 5, we assess the extent of attrition bias (figure A2 in the online appendix presents a map of the empire with the districts suffering from attrition). The Ftest for the 1916 missing data indicator and its interaction with the controls rejects the hypothesis that attrition is random (F-statistic of 4.86 with p-value of 0.002). We argue that the main reason for attrition is proximity to the war front (Kondratiev, 1922) , that is, selection on observables. We use inverse probability weights to correct for the potential bias (Wooldridge, 2002) and construct these weights using the distance to the war front as an excludable variable in the restricted model. We see that, if anything, attrition leads to an underestimation of the impact of mobilization.
Having discussed the standard threats to internal validity, we now turn to threats to identification specific to the war. Our estimates of the effects of labor removal assume that unaccounted for changes in other production inputs were orthogonal to mobilization. Horses were an important factor in production for both commune and private farms, and the mobilization of horses occurred alongside mass mobilization. Working against the commune resilience effect is the fact that horse mobilization rules tended to overmobilize horses in commune farms relative to private ones (Anfimov, 1962) . We do not control for mobilization of horses in our main specifications because of poor prewar data on horses. The prewar statistics on horses are known to be underregistered, and we employ a special procedure to correct them (Vainshtein, 1969 ; see section B of the online appendix for details). We use both a linear and a quadratic function to simulate what the actual number of horses would have been if there had been better military census coverage. In contrast, figures on horses for 1916 are of reasonable quality. The first two columns of table 6 account for mobilization of horses measured as the difference between 1916 and 1912 nonadjusted figures. In the next four columns, we report the results with horse mobilization measure based on 1912 corrected figures. The inclusion of horse mobilization does not alter the effect of mass mobilization, and its negligible impact on output could be explained by an overinvestment in horses by peasants (Litoshenko, 2001) .
Another important input that is also not well documented is agricultural equipment; statistics are known only for 1910. In column 7, we explore whether the prewar number of agricultural machines and tools (normalized by 1913 population) affects our results. The coefficient on the main variable of interest remains almost unaffected in terms of both significance and magnitude. The decrease in production is also not explained by an overall decrease in demand. Indeed, grain exports collapsed due to the war blockade; however, as discussed in section III, it was fully counterbalanced by increased army and urban demand. In the online appendix, we show that our main analysis holds when we allow for the effect of mobilization to vary by the 1913 urban share of the population. Similarly, changes in female labor force could hardly explain our results since women were already involved in agriculture before the war, although we cannot observe changes in female labor.
For interested readers, we discuss a number of additional concerns in the appendix. We show the robustness of our results to using grain yield as a dependent variable and an alternative econometric specification estimating relative changes. We present additional results regarding withinand cross-district mobility and peasant responsiveness to implicit and explicit prices.
B. Policy Implications
The experience of Russian agriculture in the war suggests that social insurance during the time of rapid change could be an important factor for any policy of massive labor reallocation. Indeed, mass mobilization and the nonmarket allocation of land afforded by the commune could have jointly caused the sharp decrease in food availability in urban areas in winter 1916, one of the suspected triggers of the 1917 Russian Revolution (Kondratiev, 1922; Gatrell, 2005) . 12 We use a dummy variable instead of distance to the front to avoid multicollinearity with military centers that are located close to the front. 13 We use nearest-neighbor matching to weather stations. Due to the short time period and the small number of weather stations, standard errors of interpolation techniques would be too large.
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Our results also shed light on postrevolutionary Stalin's collectivization as a development policy. Soviet policymakers and economists, whose view has been recently reestablished by Allen (2003) , argued that collectivization would shift redundant labor, estimates of which varied between 5 million and 30 million people (Fitzpatrick, 2001) , from agriculture to industry without any loss in agricultural output (Libkind, 1931) . The actual rural-urban reallocation of labor during the late 1920s and 1930s was 23 million (Kessler, 2001) . To this number, one could also add 6 million or 8 million victims of the famine of 1932 -1933 (Harrison, 2008 as a special kind of labor removal caused by collectivization. In either case, collectivization removed more people from the Russian village than mobilization did. However, according to Cheremukhin et al. (2013) , who employ a two-sector growth model to analyze Stalin's industrialization and its contribution to structural change, collectivization led to a smaller decrease in the labor wedge, that is, the ratio of the marginal productivity of labor in agriculture to manufacturing minus 1. According to their estimation, the labor wedge decreased from 5.9 in the late imperial period to 3.8 after collectivization. Our analysis suggests a decrease from 5.8 to 0.7 during World War I. In this respect, Stalin's policies appear to have performed substantially worse than mass mobilization, yet one must keep in mind that the relatively low World War I labor wedge is associated with a large within-district shift from market to subsistence production, an unacceptable outcome for the collectivization policy. Interestingly, Cheremukhin et al. (2016) argue that agrarian institutions were not an important barrier to structural transformation, seemingly at odds with our findings. To make this argument, the authors decompose the intersectoral labor wedge into three components: consumption, production, and labor mobility. In their model, the commune's influence on the economy is felt only through the labor mobility component, defined as the ratio of wages in manufacturing to agriculture. However, if households violate the separation property, the commune's influence could be felt not only in the labor mobility component but also in the production and consumption components. Our findings are reconciled further when one considers that industrial expansion in our setting is automatic (as it comes from the rapid swelling of military activity), and industrial firms' monopoly rents were an important source of frictions in the imperial economy.
VII. Conclusion
We find strong evidence that the mass mobilization of 16% of the labor force into the army during the Great War caused a substantial decline in agricultural output. Finding a large reduction in output due to mass mobilization in one of the quintessential examples of labor surplus (Gerschenkron, 1965) suggests that the allocation or reallocation of resources must overcome complex and costly problems, at least in the short run. Using data disaggregated by farm type, we show that mobilization decreased output less on commune farms than private farms. Peasants responded to mobilization by switching back to subsistence production, which would have been an attractive option, despite rising nominal wages, due to the nonmarket allocation of land provided by the commune. In this way, the commune Grain Area: Cultivated area of summer and winter wheat, summer and winter rye, barley, and oats. The unit of observation is District-Year, where cultivated area is aggregated across all farms in a district in a year. See the text and the online appendix for details on the adjustments of the prewar number of horses in a district. FDFE estimates the model in first differences using district fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.1.
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offered peasants social insurance, which was largely absent in urban areas, in a time of rapid change and uncertainty.
To demonstrate the importance of social insurance in the demand for commune lands, we present evidence that the commune increased subsistence production in response to mass mobilization and did so to a greater extent in districts with a greater capacity of nonmarket allocation in the commune. The peasants' revealed preference for the commune shows that the same factors that give rise to productivity differentials may heavily constrain the economic response to policy interventions designed to correct for misallocation. Since nonmarket access to land and social insurance are often core components of agrarian institutions, these results have policy relevance for developing countries in Latin America, East Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.
For Russia, in particular, our estimates improve the understanding of prerevolutionary agriculture in relation to several historical debates. First, the pro-commune peasant response to labor removal supports an institutional explanation of the origins and persistence of labor misallocation and relatively low agricultural productivity in late imperial Russia. At the same time, the results also provide justification for the designers of the Great Reforms of the 1860s, including the emancipation of serfs, which institutionalized the commune, by showing that the commune was an important source of social insurance for peasants during this time of low market development. Second, our results have implications for the causes of the Russian Revolution in 1917, supporting the view of a mutual causation of an urban food crisis by both World War I and the institution of the commune. Finally, we contribute to the critical appraisal of the success of Stalin's industrialization policies, offering evidence that his development strategy likely underestimated the large short-run agricultural loss associated with massive labor removal.
Finally, several characteristics of Russian agriculture and rural institutions might affect the external validity of our results. First, Russian farmers face a fairly harsh climate and short growing season, which may have caused the three-field system to persist longer than in other areas of the world. Even so, Russia has plenty of climate variation and regional weather differences, and both annual temperature and rainfall do not affect our results. Another stylized fact is the low labor-to-land ratio, which would contrast with India, for example. Again, Russia has plenty of variation with European provinces having relatively high levels of population density. Our results do not change when restricted to European provinces only. Compared to Europe, Russia had less coverage by rail and worse infrastructure. Consequently, some industry was located in rural areas, which would have soaked up agricultural labor. Once again, railroad density varied with some provinces having European levels of rail infrastructure. A more careful analysis of the dependence of agricultural productivity differentials on railroad density and industry location would be preferable in order to generalize the results. Finally, the rural institutions of this period were part of the response to the 1861 serf emancipation. This response surely altered the nature of labor misallocation, calling for a deeper investigation of the relationship between the legacy of serfdom and labor misallocation in agricultural production.
